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 Reform in Lieu of Change: 
Tastes Great, Less Filling 
 In this response to Light, Koppell argues that the increas-
ing frequency of reform may refl ect Congress ’ s inability to 
make signifi cant changes to the substance of entrenched 
government programs. Moreover, he observes that the 
more profound evolution in government has been the 
movement toward market-based provision of services, 
which has created demand for new competencies in the 
public sector. 
 I
n writing about the nature of bureaucratic reform, 
Paul Light may have chosen his metaphor too 
skillfully. His  “ tides of reform ” perfectly capture 
the phenomenon he has meticulously documented. 
He makes it seem natural, inevitable, and perhaps a 
bit  too unremarkable. 
 Light ’ s model demonstrates the relentless, if aimless, 
march of reform. In the mode of a geologist, Light 
looks at the thickness of sedimentary layers of legisla-
tion to determine what was going on during key 
historical periods. In recent decades, for example, we 
have seen a dramatic increase in the rate of accretion 
for reform measures. Th e explanation (probably) lies 
not in a volcanic eruption or meteor impact but in 
something else, some greater change in the American 
political system. 
 Although Light explores the rise of  “ liberation ” reform 
at seemingly dissimilar moments in American history 
and the correlation of  “ watchful eye ” reform with 
public distrust, the  meaning of all these waves remains 
unclear. Putting aside the question of whether all this 
reform works — that is, whether it makes government 
better at achieving its objectives — what does the re-
form frenzy tell us about the state of polity? Or per-
haps less grandiosely, can the phenomenon that Light 
captures be viewed as an indicator of something more 
profound? 
 Th e fi rst possibility is that reform — or more accu-
rately, reform  legislation — has emerged as a substitute 
for actual change, which is eff ectively impossible in 
the current political environment. Jonathan  Rauch 
(1994) has characterized the American political system 
as suff ering from  “ demosclerosis, ” that is, incapable of 
moving as a consequence of powerful interest groups 
and electoral incentives of legislators and bureaucracies 
intent on protecting budgets and full-time equivalent 
employees. 
Clearly, it is hyperbole to say that  nothing happens. 
Th e last decade or so has seen signifi cant alterations in 
federal welfare and education policy. 
 But programs are rarely eliminated or consolidated, 
even when doing so would make a great deal of sense. 
New programs are often dead on arrival because bud-
get constraints mandate the elimination of some 
existing item to pay for them.  “ Issue networks ” may 
have metaphorically supplanted  “ iron triangles, ” but 
they are no less formidable as a source of systemic 
inertia ( Heclo 1978 ). Constituencies are mobilized, 
subcommittee chairmen fi ercely protect their hard-
won terrain, and agency offi  cials tenaciously sink their 
claws into budget authority that will never be seen 
again once it is retracted. 
 Only by pulling the process out of the political meat 
grinder through extralegislative mechanisms such as 
the Base Realignment and Closure Commission does 
it seem these combined forces can be overcome. It 
matters not whether eff orts to pare back this or that 
agency are motivated by narrow political interest or 
high-minded concern for the eff ective functioning of 
government. Th e overwhelming majority of such 
eff orts have failed. It is simply too hard to really 
change anything. 
 Th us, the reform measures that Light counts are feeble 
yet feasible substitutes for renovation. Th eir popularity 
is a sign that many members of Congress and others 
in the federal policy-making universe have essentially 
given up on change. Reform is  “ change lite ” — less 
satisfying but attainable. Still, it feeds the illusion 
(delusion?) that Congress is actively engaged in the 
business of public administration. Of course,  Congress 
 Jonathan GS Koppell is an associate 
professor of politics and management at 
the Yale School of Management. He has 
written on the dynamics of quasi-
government and is currently writing a book 
about the organization and administration 
of transnational governance organizations. 
 E-mail:  jonathan.koppell@yale.edu . 
Exchange
20 Public Administration Review • January | February 2006
 Jonathan  Koppell 
  Yale University 
engages in the yearly budget and appropriations pro-
cess, the most formidable tool at its disposal for over-
sight of the vast federal bureaucracy. But it has 
its limitations. Th e change in the year-to-year budget 
is rather limited, particularly the discretionary portion 
of the budget, which is ostensibly where Congress can 
exercise the most infl uence. Previous budget decisions 
as well as the agenda-setting power of the White 
House and permanent bureaucracy further circum-
scribe congressional authority ( Kettl 1989 ). Th e bud-
get is a blunt tool, and it, too, has been 
dulled by the ceaseless grinding away of interest 
group politics. 
 Management reform may be the most accessible 
means available to legislators who are unhappy with 
the status quo. It may be easier to attempt to alter the 
substance of a federal program through general reform 
than by direct attack. Th e across-the-board introduc-
tion of cost – benefi t analysis for new regulations illus-
trates this idea. Widely acknowledged as having the 
intent of curtailing many agencies ’ regulatory eff orts, 
its passage may have been more likely than any bill 
aimed at shutting down or retrenching an individual 
regulatory agency. 1 
 Light acknowledges Terry Moe ’ s powerful observation 
that many government agencies are  “ designed to fail. ” 
Losers of legislative battles are often able to sow the 
seeds of bureaucratic failure in the design of govern-
ment agencies created against their wishes. Moreover, 
the winners may saddle agencies with burdensome 
designs to prevent future generations from under-
mining their victory. What Light does not consider is 
that these observations apply equally to reform eff orts! 
In assuming that all reform is intended to make 
 government work better, Light shows natural  “ good 
government ” instincts when a little more cynicism is 
probably in order. Surely, the features of a reform bill 
are as likely to include subversive elements as legisla-
tion creating a new entity. 
 Th erefore, the problem of measuring whether any 
reform has  “ worked ” is even more vexing than Light 
suggests. Th e reform may never have been expected to 
work in the fi rst place — if by  “ work, ” we mean,  “ make 
the government agency function more eff ectively. ” 
Th e reformer may have judged success by the in-
creased inertness of the bureaucracy. 
 Are we to conclude, then, that government remains 
static, ever unchanging? Of course not. But it isn ’ t 
clear that the study of legislative reform captures the 
most interesting metamorphosis. It is, of course, ter-
ribly unfair to criticize a comprehensive study on one 
topic for failing to cover everything else. Nevertheless, 
one limitation of Light ’ s study of reform during the 
last 60-odd years is that it artifi cially circumscribes the 
world. If we consider a much broader conception of 
reform, one that includes gradual shifts in the ap-
proach to public policy embodied in the whole pano-
ply of government programs, then the examination of 
reform legislation provides only a partial glimpse. It is 
as if we were commenting on the state of the world ’ s 
oceans based on tidal observations from a perch on a 
single beach. 
 Th e irregular movements from one reform philosophy 
to another do not fully capture slower shifts in the 
general conception of government ’ s role in society. 
Nor can we truly appreciate how the expectations for 
government intervention in the economy or society 
have changed over the years by interpreting the data 
Light has compiled. 
 Although there has been little consistency within the 
reform universe, a general trend is observable from a 
few steps further back. In the last three decades, the 
government ’ s delivery of public goods has increasingly 
come to depend on markets and private-sector organi-
zations. Th is is true in ways that are both prosaic and 
profound. 
 Th e contracting of public services is nothing new. But 
as public administration scholars and professionals 
have noted (with Light leading the way), the reliance 
on contractors has accelerated in the last 25 years at 
every level of government, and it has been motivated 
by two factors. One is ideological: the belief that 
private-sector organizations are inherently more ef-
fi cient and eff ective than government agencies. Th e 
second is political: the desire to reduce the apparent 
size of government by shifting employment from 
federal bureaucracies to the contractors who work for 
them (usually at greater net expense). Th e eff ect has 
been especially profound in some agencies. Th e U.S. 
Agency for International Development, for example, 
has evolved into a manager of contracts, relying on a 
host of  “ beltway bandits ” to implement most of its 
programs ( Offi  ce of the Vice President 1993 ). Over 
the long term, such evolution has literally changed the 
shape of government, with government bureaucracies 
rendered top heavy as actual service providers are 
increasingly employed by private fi rms ( Light 1999 ). 
 More signifi cant is the use of market-based mecha-
nisms in place of traditional administrative tools. Th e 
cutting edge of this trend is in the regulatory arena. 
Command-and-control-style regulation, after years of 
being pilloried, is being pushed aside by novel ap-
proaches ( Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998 ). In the 
area of emissions regulation, for example, permit 
trading places the reduction decisions in the hands of 
fi rms. Th is logic has been extended to land use, in 
which grazing permits and mineral-extraction rights 
have been auctioned (so far on a pilot basis). Th is 
approach uses the market to determine the  “ value ” of 
the privilege to consume a public good and even shifts 
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political activism to the marketplace by giving envi-
ronmentalists an opportunity to purchase land-use 
privileges or pollution permits. 2 
 Other uses of the marketplace are already institution-
alized and viewed as models to be extended to new 
areas. Government insurance and loan-guarantee 
programs are vital public policy tools in a wide range 
of policy areas, including agriculture, housing, trade, 
international development, energy, small business, and 
so on. Such programs attempt to eff ect change not by 
direct expenditure but by altering the incentives of 
private-market participants. Th is has the major benefi t 
of reducing outlays while increasing risk. Govern-
ment ’ s capability is pared with this approach, limited 
to the extent that it can shape the incentives of profi t-
driven actors. 
 Pushed by changes in budget rules, fi scal constraints, 
and a belief that market instruments are more eff ec-
tively wielded by institutions that are designed to 
function in the marketplace, the last few decades have 
seen increasing reliance on public-sector institutions 
that look more like private-sector organizations. Ex-
perimental during the First World War, the perma-
nent population of government corporations boomed 
during and following World War II. Interestingly, 
government corporations have become, in many re-
spects, indistinguishable from government agencies. 
Th ey are on budget, receive appropriated dollars, and 
are staff ed by presidential appointees and civil ser-
vants. Indeed, the defi nition of a government corpora-
tion is so ambiguous that a Government 
Accountability Offi  ce study of such organizations 
relied on entities to determine whether they were, in 
fact, government corporations ( GAO 1995 ). 
 What makes a  “ true ” government corporation diff er-
ent from an agency is its generation of revenue, which 
typically covers its costs. Th is represents a departure 
from the traditional agency model because it intro-
duces return as a constraint rather than the tradi-
tional, legislatively determined budget. Admittedly, 
for most government corporations, this is not a hard 
constraint because their budgets are not literally con-
strained by revenues, but its eff ect is real. Managers of 
government corporations must shape activities with 
the goal of breaking even ( Koppell 2003 ). 
 Strange mutations of the basic government corpora-
tion have spread across the governmental landscape. 
Most are surprised to learn of the federal government ’ s 
extensive lineup of venture capital funds, for example. 
Both the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and 
the U.S. Agency for International Development over-
see a portfolio of government venture capital funds. 3 
Most intriguing is the Central Intelligence Agency ’ s 
In-Q-Tel, a technology fund named after the gadget 
wizard, Q, of the James Bond fi lms. 
 Two other public – private  “ hybrids ” have funny names 
as well, but their fi nancial heft and centrality in the 
U.S. housing market make Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac serious business. Th e two companies are govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises (GSEs); both are publicly 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange and endowed 
with special privileges by their creator, Congress. 
Fannie and Freddie must not only break even, they 
owe a profi table return to their shareholders while 
meeting regulatory demands for fi scal safety and at-
tainment of public policy goals. Congress is currently 
considering legislation that would revamp the regula-
tory infrastructure for the housing GSEs in the face of 
revelations of fi nancial mismanagement and perennial 
concerns that the two companies are not doing 
enough to justify their eff ective federal subsidy. 
 Th ese developments represent the new face of govern-
ment. It is the embodiment of reform that is not tidal 
but tectonic, slowly altering the contours of the public 
sector. Interestingly, the emergence of governance in 
its new form is making it clearer than ever that  true 
reform is necessary if the state is to remain eff ective in 
its new guise. In this respect, there are three priorities. 
 First, our understanding of regulation must catch up 
with reality. Government will be under increasing 
pressure to develop more market-based alternatives to 
traditional regulation, and traditional approaches 
must be adapted to meet new demands. Hybrid orga-
nizations have less formal links to the federal bureau-
cracy than traditional agencies; they are not on 
budget, they are not staff ed by appointees, and they 
are exempt from management laws. Generally, they 
are  “ controlled ” through regulatory relationships 
rather than by administration. To make hybrids work 
as instruments of public policy, government will have 
to get better at using regulation as a substitute for 
administration. 
 Second, the reliance on contractors is placing a pre-
mium on contract management as a government skill. 
In the coming years, the skillfulness with which this 
function is executed — designing tasks, soliciting bids, 
monitoring and measuring performance — will be the 
crucial determinant of government eff ectiveness. 
 Finally, use of market-based mechanisms such as loan 
guarantees and insurance represents an intelligent 
 leveraging of the U.S. government ’ s creditworthiness. It 
creates public goods without adding to public debt, but 
it also poses incredible risk to the public. At present, 
however, the federal government has not demonstrated 
the ability to be a sound risk manager. Th is is perhaps 
the greatest reform needed in government today. With 
trillions of dollars in outstanding liability, the federal 
government is sitting on a fi nancial powder keg that 
could explode under trying circumstances. If Congress 
is serious about getting back into management, it needs 
22 Public Administration Review • January | February 2006
to pass up the next opportunity for  “ paperwork reduc-
tion ” or  “ performance and results ” and do something 
about risk management. 
 Would that be liberation, scientifi c management, 
watchful eye, or war on waste? 
 Notes 
 1.  In fact, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefi t Act 
of 1995 and several successors failed to get congres-
sional approval, although some aspects of this and 
similar bills have been implemented by executive 
order (Anderson, Chirba-Martin, Elliott, et al. 
1989). 
 2.  Th is strategy is under attack from those who argue 
that environmentalists should not be allowed to 
purchase grazing rights with the intention of letting 
them remain ungrazed. In the American tradition, 
litigation has commenced ( Heilprin 2005 ). 
 3.  Each set of funds has very diff erent structure. 
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